THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
56
the European Council and the consent of the UK
government to extend the negotiating period
7
.
European institutions started preparing for
the decision-making required under the applica-
tion of Article 50 well before the trigger date
with an eye to undertaking effective negotia-
tions as soon as possible. Michel Barnier, whom
the Commission had appointed chief negotiator
during the summer of 2016, lost no time in put-
ting together a solid team known as Task Force
50,
and consultations with EU institutions and
key Member States were conducted for the pur-
pose of establishing a European negotiating po-
sition. On the basis of this inter-institutional
groundwork, the European Council adopted a
set of general guidelines for Brexit negotiations
on 29 April 2017
8
.
7
Council guidelines for the application of Article 50 of the
Treaty stipulated that “the date of entry into force of the
withdrawal agreement should be at the latest 00:00 Central
European (Brussels) time 30 March 2019”. The Commis-
sion’s recommendation for a Council decision furthermore
states that regardless of whether or not such an agreement
is reached and enters into force, all Union Treaties will cease
to apply to the United Kingdom and its withdrawal will be-
come effective as of that hour and date. See: Council of the
European Union,
Annex of Council decision (UE, Euratom)
2017/... authorising the opening of negotiations with the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for
an agreement setting out the arrangements for its with-
drawal from the European Union
Brussels, 22 May 2017,
(XT 21016/17 ADD 1 REV 2), pt. 8; European Commission,
Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the
Commission to open negotiations on an agreement with
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the
European Union,
Brussels, 3rd May 2017, (COM(2017) 218
final), p. 2.
8
As per Article 50, the member of the European Coun-
cil representing the UK is barred from participating in dis-
cussions related to the withdrawal process, in which only
the heads of state or government representing the 27 re-
maining Member States will have the right to take part.
European Council (Art. 50)
Guidelines following the United
Kingdom’s notification under
Article 50 TUE,
Brussels, 29
April 2017 (EUCO XT 20004/17).
As Article 50 of the TEU contained only ge-
neric and somewhat ambiguous provisions for
the withdrawal of a Member State, the bulk of
initial EU negotiation guidelines issued by the
European Council were devoted to procedural is-
sues and the rest to objectives and points to be
negotiated. All of this material formed an
acquis
constitutionnel,
a corpus of basic principles
shared by two other EU institutions (the European
Parliament and the European Commission), the
purpose of which was to “preserve the interests
of the Union”, which in the context of the nego-
tiations to follow would mean protecting the EU
from the risk of disintegration by focusing heav-
ily on damage control.
The EU negotiating strategy was based upon
four basic principles conceived to strengthen
the EU’s bargaining position and ensure unity
and cohesion between Member States and EU
institutions throughout the lengthy process.
These were:
1. All negotiation would be conducted exclu-
sively through one officially designated insti-
tutional channel as contemplated in Article
50 (a role assumed by the Commission-
appointed negotiator Michel Barnier). No
bilateral negotiation, direct negotiation be-
tween the UK and individual Member States
or minilateral negotiation on the part of
groups of States was to be allowed
9
.
2. Unilateral withdrawal of notification on the
part of the UK would not be impossible but
the possibility of reversing the process would
remain open under mutual agreement,
the approval of which would depend on the
9
The governments of various individual Member States
have reportedly turned down attempts on the part of the
UK diplomatic corps to open bilateral negotiations, remind-
ing these contacts that the Commission is the Union’s sole
negotiator on withdrawal.