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DAESH IN SYRIA: MAJOR POTENTIAL
FOR EXPANSION
Fabrice Balanche
1
WithDaesh, jihadismhas changed strategy. The aimis no longer tobuild an international
network, but to secure territory. This new strategy is supported by Bin Laden’s death and
the dislocation of the al-Qaeda network, particularly since the self-proclaimed caliph al-
Baghdadi broke off relations with Bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri. This strategy
is in strict line with the one al-Zarqawi used in Iraq since 2006. It consists of taking root by
sharing the fights of local Sunni populations, rather than undertaking spectacular attacks
against international interests. Back then, a first “Islamic State” in Iraq was proclaimed by
supporters of al-Zarqawi, led by one al-Baghdadi. American troops were a favourite target,
but the main enemies were Shiites and Kurds. In Iraq, like in Syria, conflicts between
the communities outweighed universal jihad and the destruction of Israel encouraged by
Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda’s ideologist criticised this approach, which would lead to a
fitna ta’ifiyya
(communal strife) between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, distancing them from
the supreme objective and weakening jihad. Shiite Muslims are heretics who must be
eradicated, but their turn will come later.
2
When it entered Syria, Daesh had already established solid support bases in Mosul and
al-Anbar, Iraq’s Sunni provinces, which acted as a source of fighters and financial resources.
It had already set-up a parallel tax system to the Iraqi state. The Sunni Arab populations
of Northern Iraq felt marginalised by the government in Baghdad. Used to leading the
country, they were unhappy with the Shiite community having come to power in 2003.
1 Associate Professor in Political Geography at Université Lyon 2.
2 Kepel G (2008).
Terreur et martyre: relever le défi de la civilisation. [Beyond terror and martyrdom: the
challenge of civilisation]
. Paris: Flammarion.