28 / 145
THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
28
the EU to accept their share of responsibility for
dealing with the problem, and appeals to ethnic
or religious homogeneity to justify their ap-
proach to the problem: throughout 2015, all of
these have simply provided succour to those
parties whose electoral programmes thrive on
fear and demagoguery.
An example of this is provided by the huge
political difficulties faced by German Chancellor,
Angela Merkel, whose initial response was to
declare an open doors policy, which simply laid
bare the “every man for himself” approach that
has become the norm among member states
after 60 years of cooperation to build the EU.
This is illustrated most powerfully by the fact
that very few EU countries have understood and
agreed to share the difficulties of frontier coun-
tries (Greece and Italy, among others) in manag-
ing the situation, and the absence of any na-
tional proposals to replace the Dublin Regulation
and create a European asylum and refugee
framework.
The triggers, part III: terrorism
International terrorism, which is practically the
only form of terrorism that currently poses a
threat to European citizens and European de-
mocracy, exacted a brutal price on EU member
states in 2015: the terrible attacks in Paris, both
in January against satirical magazine,
Charlie
Hebdo
, and the indiscriminate killings in No-
vember, were the most dramatic examples of
this barbarity.
In partnership with EU institutions, member
states responded quickly and effectively to this
threat, which caused tension in a number of the
continent’s capitals, including London, Brussels
and others. However, with the exception of
France, the governments of member states
resisted the temptation to introduce legislation
to restrict rights and freedoms in situations of a
heightened threat of terrorism.
Notwithstanding, the populist far-right par-
ties quickly established a link between terror-
ism, religion and refugees with the aim of pro-
voking a spiral of racism and xenophobia.
Although they failed to achieve their objective,
it is clear that this strategy helped them to gain
ground and to increase their support.
There’s enough here for everyone: from the
absence of a European public opinion to
the absence of social agents
Restrictions on rights and freedoms, nationalism
and populism are all facilitated by the weaken-
ing of civil society. In moments of crisis and
threat, group identification and simplistic, dem-
agogic solutions can win out over approaches
that emphasise citizenship and democracy.
This explains why the weakness of tradition-
al political parties has been compounded by the
ineffectiveness of social agents in stemming the
progress of extremist positions. More important
still, this has been made possible by the absence
of a European public opinion formed on the ba-
sis of shared values that transcend national bor-
ders.
Conclusion
While the threats identified above have indeed
materialised during the course of 2015, it is also
true that the gradual recovery now under way,
the fact that EU institutions are now exercising
their competencies in full, five years after the
Treaty of Lisbon came into force, and the political
and social majority achieved by conservatives,