THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA
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Primer Minister Yatsenyuk, who won election in
the wake of a narrow People’s Front victory over
the Petro Poroshenko Bloc in parliamentary
elections held on 26 October, has stated that at
least 12 billion euros will be needed to get the
Ukrainian economy back on track. The EU has
approved three successive aid packets for
Ukraine worth a total of 3.2 billion euros, but
has also called upon the Kyiv government to im-
plement deep economic, administrative and fis-
cal reforms and eliminate the corruption and
cronyism that continue to be at the heart of
many of the country’s problems. The
International Monetary Fund took action in
February, approving 15.5 billion euros in loan
money contingent on compliance with a four-
year economic and political reform programme.
From the outset of the crisis, the EU has
closely coordinated its policy –including points
related to sanctions– with policies pursued by
the US and other countries such as Canada and
Norway. However, it became evident in early
2015 that the perspectives of leaders on differ-
ent sides of the Atlantic were less than fully
aligned when politicians in Washington grow-
ing increasingly sceptical of the outlook for a
negotiated solution began to talk about the
possibility of military aid for Ukraine. European
interests obviously differ from those of the US,
which has fewer commercial ties with Russia
and is not reliant on Russia for energy.
There are also differences of opinion within
the EU regarding the approach that Europe
should adopt towards the Ukrainian conflict,
and by extension, its relations with Russia.
Backed by the United Kingdom, Baltic countries
such as Estonia and Latvia, both which have
Russian minorities subject to official discrimina-
tion that comprise more than 25% of their pop-
ulations, and Poland, which harbours a deeply
rooted hostility towards Russia, continue to call
for a hard-line approach without concessions.
On the other hand, the majority of other
European countries including France and
Germany are more interested in seeking a nego-
tiated solution. Although tensions have been
aired, to date, the internal unity indispensable
for maintaining a successful rapport with Russia
has remained intact.
Prompted by a rapidly deteriorating situation
in January, German Chancellor Angela Merkel
and French President François Hollande flew to
the region together in February in the hope of
forging a new agreement based on the Minsk
Protocol that would halt the escalation and lead
to a definitive ceasefire. They stopped in Kyiv on
5 February before moving on to Moscow the
following day. The fruit of their efforts was a
new summit held in Minsk on 11 February at-
tended by Merkel, Hollande, Putin and Ukrainian
President Poroshenko. These leaders made a
new pact effective as of 15 February and agreed
upon a series of measures that confirm and
build upon the initial Minsk Protocol. The Minsk
II agreement calls for the creation of a security
zone of at least 50 kilometres and the imple-
mentation of constitutional reforms and special
statutes for Donetsk and Luhansk before the
end of 2015, after which the Ukraine govern-
ment will be given control of its border with
Russia, an amnesty will be declared and all for-
eign troops and arms will be withdrawn.
These new agreements made in Minsk,
which are considered to be the last opportunity
for securing peace, represent a landmark in
European policymaking, albeit tinged by the
fact the EU has no single figure with the suffi-
cient capacity to speak and negotiate in the
name of the community as a whole and must
still rely on the leaders of its most important
Member States to assume this role. It remains
to be seen if these new accords will be more