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THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA
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Justice; A Common Space on External Security;
and a Common Space on Research, Education
and Culture. The most recent initiative related
to this agreement was the Partnership for
Modernisation launched at the 2010 Rostov
summit, which was intended to provide a flexi-
ble framework for dialogue on reform, growth
and the rule of law.
The EU launched an Eastern Partnership pro-
gramme in May 2009 in the framework of its
European Neighbourhood policy. The main pur-
pose of this initiative is to strengthen bilateral
relations between Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine,
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and the EU by
helping them meet and implement EU stand-
ards in a wide range of areas. When the EU
signed Association and Free Trade Agreements
with Georgia and Moldova on 27 June 2014, a
Russian government spokesman immediately is-
sued a warning regarding the negative conse-
quences that entering into such an agreement
could have for the economies of these two for-
mer Soviet republics. There are “frozen con-
flicts” in both of these countries provoked by
Moscow-backed pro-Russian enclaves that have
declared independence (Transnistria in Moldova
and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia).
Whereas Belarus and Armenia have become
members of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic
Union, Azerbaijan is moving closer to the EU.
Experience has shown that attempting to forge
a policy directed towards any of these states
without taking Russia into account is unrealistic
and can give rise to conflicts such as the present
crisis in Ukraine.
Looking towards the future
The EU has no desire to enter into a confronta-
tion with Russia, a new cold war or, most of all,
an armed conflict. Nor does it wish for the
Russian economy to collapse, an eventuality
that could have a negative impact on European
economic recovery barely underway, or that it
enter a period of destabilisation that could have
unknown consequences. The possibility of
Russia turning its sights to the East and forging
closer ties with China is equally unattractive, in
that it would provoke a geopolitical imbalance
harmful to European interests. Europe and
Russia need each other in equal measure –not
only in view of their economic and energy inter-
dependence, but also because the security and
stability of Eastern Partnership countries, includ-
ing Ukraine, cannot be achieved without Russia
or against its will. It must also be remembered
that Russia’s nuclear potential and permanent
seat on the UN Security Council makes that
country an essential partner in the resolution of
international security problems. Without its co-
operation, it would be impossible to meet the
challenges of Jihadist terrorism (currently
Europe’s greatest security threat), the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction and organ-
ised crime or conflicts such as those in Iran and
Syria.
Nevertheless, understandings reached at any
price or from a position of weakness are unac-
ceptable. The EU cannot submit to coercion and
must draw its own red lines in regard to its rela-
tions with Russia. Most importantly, it cannot
allow Russia to meddle in the internal affairs of
its neighbours or seek to overturn political deci-
sions taken by these countries as it tried to in
the case of Ukraine. The use of sanctions as
means of applying political and economic pres-
sure on Moscow to change its posture on the
Ukrainian conflict is essential, although such a
tactic is not a per se solution and such sanctions
must be lifted as soon as the crisis is resolved.
The resolution of the Ukrainian conflict is a non-