THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA
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Putin is enormously popular in Russia. His
public opinion approval ratings rose at the out-
break of the Ukrainian conflict and soared even
higher in the wake the annexation of Crimea.
According to a December 2014 survey conduct-
ed by the independent Russian public opinion
research agency Levada, 85% of the Russian
population highly approves of his policies com-
pared to a mere 15% that does not (compared
to a ratio of 65 to 35 percent in December 2013).
Another December Levada poll revealed that
55% of survey subjects would like to see Putin
re-elected as president in 2018 and another 10%
would prefer the race to go to other candidate
who would nevertheless pursue similar policies
(compared to 26% and 14% respectively in April
2013). Only 18% would prefer a candidate with
different approach to win office in 2018.
What the Russian people lack in terms of a
tradition of democracy they make up for in na-
tionalist sentiment that explains their apprecia-
tion for a strong leader in the Kremlin who has
boosted national pride by restoring the country’s
high-profile role in international politics.
Although the combined effects of sanctions and
plummeting oil prices are bound to lower Russian
standards of living, spark protests and erode both
Putin’s popularity and national stability, no alter-
native political forces appear to have a solid foot-
ing or, in fact, to be particularly desirable. An
unforeseen catastrophe notwithstanding, it is
most likely that Putin will continue to be the EU’s
interlocutor in Moscow for many years to come.
EU-Russian relations
Some Europeans, whose opinions have only been
sharpened by the Ukrainian conflict, continue to
see the Russian Federation as a superpower that
could one day harbour grand ambitions to
dominate Europe. Nevertheless, this perception
does not square with Russia’s relative position in
the world today. In order to gain an accurate
picture of Russia’s position relative to that of the
EU, one needs to take into account that Russia’s
population is only 28.2% as large at the EU’s3
and its nominal GDP is lower than Italy’s and
barely 11.6% of that of the UE4. Even its de-
fence budget, despite a hike of 50% between
2010 and 2013, is only 31.5% of the combined
defence budgets of the EU’s 28 Member States5.
Although Russia’s vast nuclear potential must be
taken into account, it is very unlikely to be used
in conventional warfare. These comparisons are
based on aggregate figures for the EU. If one
compares Russia with individual Member States,
the picture changes dramatically, a fact that
should serve as a constant reminder that
European unity is the key to pursuing foreign
relations with Russian under favourable condi-
tions.
Russia’s economy depends greatly upon that
of the European Union, which is its leading trad-
ing partner in terms of both imports and ex-
ports. In 2013, the last year before sanctions
were imposed, European goods made up
43.6% of its total imports. In comparison, only
16.6% of its total imports came from its second
largest trading partner China. On the other side
of the coin, 51.8% of Russia’s total exports that
year went to EU countries, generating a trade
surplus in that country’s favour of over 86 billion
euros6 –a figure almost equivalent to its 2013
3World Bank population figures for 2013: Russia: 143 mil-
lon; UE: 506.7 million.
4World Bank GDP figures for 2013 in US dollars: Russia:
2.097 trillion; UE: 17.96 trillion.
5Stockholm Internal Peace Research Institute (SPRI) figures
in US dollars for 2013: Russia: 87.8 billion; EU: 278.8 billion.
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