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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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integration of the transatlantic economy in
terms of investment, subsidiaries or jobs.
Whether it is a negotiating strategy to raise the
pressure, a threat that will not be carried out, or
not, the distorting and delegitimising effects on
the multilateral system are clear, more so if they
come from the world’s greatest power, and
could create a domino effect, or uncontrollable
reactions. Therefore, the EU Member States
must come to together to appeal to their
American counterpart to establish ad hoc chan-
nels of negotiation on trade between the two. In
parallel, Europe holds the card of “multilateralis-
ing” the trade war issue, not only in the WTO –
joining other countries affected by the tariffs –,
but also in a major forum such as the G20, with
a view to halting the unilateral action on the part
of the United States with the collaboration of
the rest of the big economies.
“Illiberal” but multilateral China
The real target of Trump’s trade war is not so
much Europe, but China, which is Trump’s object
of obsession because of a $375-billion trade def-
icit, while it is the country that is perceived most
negatively in US business circles. Trump’s policies
caused the EU to find itself blocked into an in-
cipient escalation of a trade war between the
two powers in early April 2018 and have compli-
cated the progress of the EU’s bilateral agenda
with China. The announcement of tariffs on alu-
minium and steel was followed by the announce-
ment from Beijing that it would be taxing 128 US
products – from aluminium to pork, walnuts,
wine and fruit. At the end of March, Washington
announced further measures to slap $60 billion
worth of tariffs on Chinese products and to limit
the capacity of Chinese investment in US tech-
nology, while declaring that it would be taking
the case to the World Trade Organisation, de-
spite Trump’s strong suspicion of the institution.
Europe’s position in the face of the war be-
tween America and China has changed slightly.
The European authorities too have long been
suspicious of Chinese trade and investment prac-
tices. For example, the opacity of its bidding mar-
kets for European companies, dumping, subsi-
dies to industry, devaluation of the renminbi to
increase exports, or the purchase of European
industries in strategic sectors. However, the EU
has always reaffirmed its multilateral approach as
the most effective way of putting pressure on
Beijing. It is precisely the acceptance of the mul-
tilateral system, along with European rapport on
issues such as the defence of multilateralism or
the Paris climate change agreement – witnessed
recently in forums such as the United Nations
General Assembly, the G20 or Davos –, that
could lay the foundations for a future under-
standing with China no longer dependant on
Washington necessarily.
With Beijing, the Europeans are faced with
the paradox of an “illiberal” regime on the do-
mestic front that is gradually expansionist
abroad, but which embraces multilateralism and
aligns with Europe on certain fundamental is-
sues. At a time when the Chinese regime is con-
centrating power in the figure of President Xi
Jinping, following the 19
th
Communist Party
Congress of October 2017, the Europeans re-
main hesitant, failing to engage in dialogue or
exercise influence sufficiently in a unified man-
ner. Compared with the United States, and rela-
tive to China’s habitat in Asia, the EU presence
remains notably lacking, especially in the geopo-
litical field of the hard power struggle – econom-
ic and military means –, as revealed in the United
States’ struggle with Kim Jong-un’s North Korea,
where it played practically no role at all. The
same applies to Chinese expansionism in its