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Bombing from behind? An assessment of US strategy vis-à-vis ISIL
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It was noticeable this time that no transatlantic disagreement emerged, as all NATO
countries joined the coalition. NATO even hosted the first meeting of foreign ministers
from the countries participating, in December 2014. The Obama calculus thus relies on
the expectation that both regional and local partners will help achieve a breakthrough
on the battlefield. However, the coalition against ISIL faces significant obstacles such as
an imbalanced division of labour, conflicting security priorities among its members and
limited effectiveness of partners on the ground.
On the division of labour, the US is by far doing most of the work. By the end of
September 2014, after two months of bombing ISIL targets, the US share of the coalition’s
airstrikes already accounted for 74% of the total (177 out of 240). By February 2015, this
had increased to 81% (1820 out of 2247).
In addition, there have been various political and operational issues between the US and
some of its partners. The crash of a Jordanian F-16 fighter aircraft on mission near Raqqa in
December, and the subsequent capture of its pilot, triggered concerns among the partners
involved in the air campaign. As a result, the UAE, which was among the most active
Arab partners in the coalition, suspended its combat missions, fearing for the pilots’ safety.
Specifically, UAE authorities demanded that the US should bring its search-and-rescue
teams in northern Iraq closer to the battleground. In February, the Pentagon confirmed
it was moving its assets closer. But although this provides the UAE forces with sufficient
reassurances, it also deepens the imbalance between the US and its allies regarding the
risks taken. The existence of different national caveats and rules of engagement is nothing
new, as witnessed in Afghanistan, but the absence of an international framework (whether
UN, NATO or EU) makes coordination even harder.
These operational constraints are minor compared to some fundamental political
divergences. In particular, US-Turkey cooperation against ISIL proved to be a very sensitive
issue. The government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been repeatedly accused of letting
foreign fighters cross its border with Syria. The logic was that the fight against Assad took
priority over the extremist nature of these combatants.
But soon the fight against ISIL coalesced with the Kurdish question. The siege of
Kobane in the fall of 2014 evidenced a significant gap between US and Turkish interests.
Whereas the American government increased its airstrikes and arms supplies to help the
Kurdish forces counter the ISIL offensive, the Turks showed reluctance to allow any flow
(of fighters or weaponry) to reach the Syrian Kurdish area. Two concerns were driving the
Turkish calculus: first, the fear that open support to US-backed Kurdish forces against ISIL
would be read by Sunni Turks as a way to weaken any potential Sunni influence in Syria;
second, the understanding that strengthening Syrian Kurdish forces such as the PYD, an
affiliate of the PKK, would impact the domestic stability of Turkey.
Eventually, in February 2015, Turkey and the US signed an agreement to train and
equip moderate Syrian fighters. Few details on the programme have been made public
and it is not clear when the training is supposed to start. Moreover, public statements by
Turkish and American officials showed different expectations. Whereas Turkish authorities
included Assad’s forces as one of the targets of this new programme, the Pentagon made