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Jean-Loup Samaan
Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, told the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in December 2014: “We do not see a situation in which the rebels are able
to remove him [Assad] from power”.18 A month later, the US backed the Syria peace talks
held by the Russian government in Moscow, thus underlining that Washington was quietly
abandoning its demand that President Assad step down as part of any settlement.
In Iraq too, the endstate is uncertain. The destruction of ISIL will not in itself settle
the core issue, namely the question of the social contract by which all communities
agree to live together. The US administration has acknowledged the problem created by
Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki’s sectarian policies. After months of deteriorating relations
between Maliki and Obama, the former accepted not to run for a third term and endorsed
the Prime Minister-designate Haidar al Abadi. In return, Obama called on the new Iraqi
government to seize “the enormous opportunity of forming a new inclusive government”.19
However, this inclusiveness is not yet visible. Today, Sunni tribes oppose ISIL’s brutal
rule, but that does not mean they trust the government in Baghdad. Although al Abadi has
distanced himself from Nuri al Maliki on many issues, the latter is still part of the regime
(as Vice-President) and remains influential in the Prime Minister’s office through the
extensive entourage he nominated before his resignation. Furthermore, Maliki is already
preparing his return to office for the not so distant future.20
In any case, apart from replacing Maliki, the US policy vis-à-vis the Iraqi regime has not
been dramatically transformed and focuses on reactive measures (airstrikes and military
training) to the rise of ISIL, rather than on governance measures that would eventually
address the deeply rooted discontent in the Sunni community.
Therefore, to believe that destroying ISIL means ending the conflict amounts to
strategic short-sightedness. Tackling the issue of Sunni discontent in Iraq will require long-
term reforms, while the conflict in Syria may well go on even after ISIL has been weakened
or removed. This inability of the American government to design a clear endstate leads us
to a more profound question on the way the US envisions its military interventions in the
Middle East today.
Making sense of US strategic inconsistencies
In November 2014, General Dempsey declared in testimony to the House Armed
Services Committee: “I’m not predicting at this point that I would recommend that those
(Iraqi) forces in Mosul and along the border would need to be accompanied by US forces,
but we’re certainly considering it”.21 Dempsey’s wording was carefully chosen not to imply
any imminent American ground intervention, but the simple idea that the highest-ranking
general in US armed forces was thinking about that possibility did stir up some controversy.
18 Hudson J (2014). State Dept.: rebels are never going to defeat Assad militarily. Foreign Policy, 10
December 2014.
19 The White House Office of the Press Secretary. Statement by the President, 14 August 2014, available in:
20 Arango T. Iraq’s premier narrows divide, but challenges loom. New York Times, 15 December 2014.
21 Ackerman S, Jalabi R (2014). US military considers sending combat troops to battle Isis forces in Iraq. The
Guardian, 13 November 2014.