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Bombing from behind? An assessment of US strategy vis-à-vis ISIL
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In today’s Washington, the contemplation of such scenarios is perceived as politically toxic.
Last February, Obama made clear that this option was off the table:
“The resolution we’ve submitted today does not call for the deployment of U.S. ground
combat forces to Iraq or Syria. It is not the authorization of another ground war, like
Afghanistan or Iraq. […] As I’ve said before, I’m convinced that the United States should
not get dragged back into another prolonged ground war in the Middle East. That’s not in
our national security interest and it’s not necessary for us to defeat ISIL. Local forces on
the ground who know their countries best are best positioned to take the ground fight to
ISIL – and that’s what they’re doing.”22
Even as President Assad used chemical weapons in August 2013, crossing a “red line”
which Obama himself had defined, the US administration expressed extreme caution.
During a press conference a few days later, Secretary of State John Kerry went as far as to
promise “a very limited, very targeted, very short-term effort, an unbelievably small, limited
kind of effort”. Such statements hardly qualify as demonstrations of force.23
To understand the logic – or lack of logic – of the US strategy vis-à-vis ISIL, we may
need to go back to the political trauma that the 2003 invasion of Iraq engendered in the
American political community. One of the consequences of the post-Iraq invasion era is
the increasing belief that any new commitment of US armed forces should be limited in
scope and should at all costs exclude any ground presence. The latest National Security
Strategy issued by the White House, in February 2015, clearly states this goal: “We shifted
away from a model of fighting costly, large-scale ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in
which the United States – particularly our military – bore an enormous burden. Instead we
are now pursuing a more sustainable approach that prioritizes targeted counterterrorism
operations, collective action with responsible partners.”24
The case supporting this narrative is the presumed success of the allied operations in
Libya in 2011. The very fact that Libya unravelled afterwards and became a failed state
should raise doubts about the relevance of the “leading from behind” approach.25 But even
putting Libya aside, the problem is that in Syria and Iraq the US faces a conundrum that
does not fit into this intellectual framework. Backed by allies with limited capabilities and
helping local forces whose military readiness is fragile, the US is left as the sole power able
to make a difference. Beyond the fight against ISIL, it is likely that Washington, whether it
likes it or not, will remain deeply enmeshed with the future of the Middle East. In the end,
with all the talks of a pivot toward Asia, the Obama administration may have thought it was
out of the Middle East but may yet have to recognize that it actually never left.
22 The White House Office of the Press Secretary. Remarks by the President on Request to Congress for
Authorization of Force Against ISIL. 11 February 2015, Available IN:
press-office/2015/02/11/remarks-president-request-congress-authorization-force-against-isil.
23 Blake A (2013). Kerry: Military action in Syria would be ‘unbelievably small. Washington Post, 9
September 2013.
24 The White House. National Security Strategy. February 2015, p. 9. Available in:
sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf, accessed on 20 February 2015.
25 Krauthammer C (2011). The Obama doctrine: leading from behind. Washington Post , 28 April 2011.