43 / 92
Iranian policy towards post-Saddam Iraq
41
The broader parameters of Iranian interests in Iraq, as briefly detailed above, provide a
rudimentary understanding of Iranian grand strategic preferences in the Iraqi context. But
how does Iranian domestic politics shape policy towards Iraq?
The consequence of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s unique blend of elected and
unelected authority in its governance has given rise to the concept of “decision shaping”.
While playing a great role in decision making, “decision shaping” is distinct from decision
making.
The primary institution for decision making on issues pertaining to Iraq is the Supreme
National Security Council (SNSC). This decision-making body, which gathers the heads
of the three branches of government along with leading civilian and military officials, is
headed by the President, whom appoints its Secretary. The executive branch has multiple
representatives in the SNSC, the most important of which are the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Defense, Intelligence and Interior. Thus, the incumbent cabinet has several
avenues to exert influence on the shape of decisions being made.
On major foreign policy issues, including Iraq, the Supreme Leader sets the framework
for policy. However, this framework is broad, and allows various actors to exert influence
on its shape. The process is such that the framework is discussed among relevant SNSC
members, whom, subsequent to internal discussions, submit decisions to the Supreme
Leader for final review. While possessing a veto, the Supreme Leader rarely vetoes SNSC
decisions.
Many observers summarily dismiss the relevance of the executive branch in shaping
policy towards Iraq, pointing to the IRGC as both shaper and executor of Iranian policy.
This approach ignores important aspects of Iranian decision making.
The evolution of Iranian policy towards Iraq over the past year illustrates one important
consideration: along with expanded influence comes expanded responsibility. Managing
a problem is very different from owning it. Iran has no wish to end up in the quagmire
which compelled the withdrawal of the US military. Along this vein, Iran’s role in the
orderly appointment of Abadi as Iraqi Prime Minister is a prime example of Tehran’s
desire to manage rather than “own” the issue of Iraq. The latter also reflects the impact
of the executive branch on decision making: key figures close to Iranian President
Hassan Rouhani, including SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani, played an important role
in facilitating consensus for a peaceful transition of power. Key SNSC members close to
President Rouhani have indeed increasingly played a role in shaping policy towards Iraq,
and managing relations with both Baghdad and Erbil.
Further evidencing the relevance of a multitude of actors, including the executive
branch, in the formation of policy towards Iraq – and Iraqi cognizance of this reality – is
Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s reception of various Iranian officials. Under heavy media coverage,
then Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made a landmark trip to Iraq in the spring of
2008. Even though a visit to the holy city of Najaf was reportedly on Ahmadinejad’s agenda,
his reported failure to secure an audience with Grand Ayatollah Sistani essentially cut short
the official visit. Of note, a key political rival of Ahmadinejad, Tehran Mayor Mohammad
Baqer Qalibaf, had met with Ayatollah Sistani in the weeks prior to Ahmadinejad’s visit.