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Mohammad Ali Shabani
Hedging, hedging, hedging
Iran’s long-standing relationship with two-term former Prime Minister Maliki led
some to assume that his side-lining in the summer of 2014 would result in lessened
Iranian influence. On the contrary, the continued – and expanded – Iranian influence,
despite Maliki’s side-lining, has revealed another key component of Iranian strategy:
hedging.
Tehran has never been wedded to a single individual in its pursuit of its objectives.
Rather, for the Islamic Republic of Iran, the bottom line in its view of the Iraqi Premiership
has been that it be assumed by a member of the leading Shia Iraqi faction, i.e. Dawah
in the post-2003 context to date. It should be noted here that the division of the posts of
President, Speaker and Prime Minister along ethnic/confessional lines in Iraq is an Iraqi
arrangement.
Less than two weeks after facilitating Abadi’s assumption of the Iraqi Premiership,
Maliki – who currently serves as Vice President – was invited to Tehran to meet with
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. This hedging and continued cultivation of ties
with various factions and figures in Iraq is on-going, and more importantly, not exclusive
to Iran’s approach to the Shia Iraqi community. As mentioned above, Iran enjoys
longstanding ties with Iraqi Kurdish leaders, and post-2003, Tehran has also increasingly
established contact with Sunni Iraqi leaders.
Venerating the Sayyid
Much of available analysis of relations between Iran and post-Saddam Iraq is decidedly
one-sided in its perceptions and illustrations. Influence is portrayed as one-way, originating
from Iran. While Iranian influence in Iraq is paramount, Iraqi influence on Iran should not
be discounted. Nowhere is the two-way nature of influence in the contemporary Iran-Iraq
relationship more evident than in Tehran and Baghdad’s approaches to Grand Ayatollah
Sayyid Ali Husseini Sistani. The balance sheet of Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s influence in
clerical circles in Iran vis-à-vis Iran’s influence in clerical circles in Iraq is more complex
than perceived by many observers. The most recent expression of Iranian recognition of
the limits of its influence was evident in Tehran’s reported acquiescence in the summer
of 2014 to Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s disapproval of then-Prime Minister Maliki’s efforts to
secure a third term in office.
It should be noted that some of the things which have allowed Iran to expand its
influence also inherently limit its influence. Playing the long game means it is not in Iran’s
interests to see its friends and partners becoming overly dependent, or seen as Iranian
cronies. The evolution of ISCI’s branding, as mentioned above, is a case in point.
Iranian decision making on Iraq
To further gain a grasp of the circumstances which cause Iran’s role in Iraq to be
constructive versus disruptive, it is imperative to gain an understanding of Iranian decision
making. Like other states, Iran’s foreign policy is fundamentally dictated by two factors:
grand strategic preferences and domestic politics.