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Iranian policy towards post-Saddam Iraq
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Other notable examples which convey Iran’s longstanding ties with Iraqi factions and
figures include Tehran’s relationship with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).
This group, which was known as the “Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq”
(SCIRI) until a few years ago, was formed in Iran in the early 1980s. Its armed wing – the
Badr Brigade – was for decades formally under the command of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC). The current incarnation of this force, the Badr Organization, and
its commander – Hadi Ameri – now lead the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF), which is
at the forefront of countering ISIS in Iraq.
Iran also enjoys longstanding and deep ties with numerous Iraqi Kurdish figures and
parties. As an example, President of Iraqi Kurdistan Massoud Barzani, whom also serves as
head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), lived in a suburb of Tehran in the early
1990s.
Assertion amid hesitation
Over the years since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has repeatedly proven
itself adept at seizing opportunities provided by the inertia of other external actors. The
most recent and poignant example of how Iran has expanded its influence via an assertive
approach – amid the hesitation of other actors – is its reaction to the onslaught of ISIS.
Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has been clear about what the latter means
in practical terms: “the day Baghdad was threatened, the US hesitated, the Iranians did
not”, while referring to how he is not ready to disrupt relations with Tehran in line with
the demands of certain external actors. This approach has drastically increased Iranian
influence at the expense of other external regional actors, notably Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Seizing on limited alliance options
A defining feature of post-Saddam Iraq’s regional policy is the limited alliance options.
Some external regional actors, such as Syria, adopted policies post-2003 which were
largely geared towards securing short-term objectives, such as the expulsion of American
military forces. Other actors, such as Saudi Arabia, responded to the overthrow of Saddam
Hussein, whom while an enemy was regarded as containing Iranian influence, with refusal
to recognize the reality of the new political order in Iraq. A case in point in relation to the
latter is Riyadh’s refusal to even dispatch an envoy to Baghdad for years.
In contrast, Iranian policy has been geared towards securing both short-term objectives,
such as the expulsion of the US military, without allowing policy to turn single-tracked
and short-sighted enough to poison bilateral relations. The result is clear: having seized
on the new Iraqi political order and the changing regional landscape, Iran has effectively
positioned itself to benefit from post-Saddam Iraq’s limited alliance options. Neither Iraq
nor Iran have any illusions on the nature of this dynamic. Referring to ISIS’s onslaught,
Prime Minister Abadi has frankly stated: “Our alliance with Iran was strengthened because
of ISIS.” This matter-of-fact recognition of the practical realities assisting the emergence of
the Iranian-Iraqi relationship once again conveys Baghdad’s limited alliance options, and
its consequences.