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Bombing from behind? An assessment of US strategy vis-à-vis ISIL
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This heated discussion relates to a broader one, which is the ability of airpower
to obtain decisive results on the ground. As a matter of fact, the overreliance on air
campaigns to break the morale of enemies and to destroy it is deeply rooted in the US
military culture. But in spite of an enduring faith in this approach inside the US Air
Force, there is little evidence that strategic bombing has ever decisively determined
victory in war. 14 Unfortunately, with indecisive partners, there is no reason yet to think
that Operation Inherent Resolve will prove any different. Although officials from the
Obama administration have argued that airstrikes disrupted ISIL command, we have
seen in the first few months of 2015 that terrorist groups were still able to launch new
assaults on the route between Syria and Lebanon, or in Al Anbar province in Iraq.
The ambiguous end state
The initial objective of the Obama strategy – “degrade and eventually destroy IS” –
encapsulates one core belief: that the elimination of the terrorist organization would solve
the predicaments of both Iraq and Syria. For that reason, the US intended not to design a
Syria-Iraq strategy, but two approaches that are disconnected from each other. This reflects
a failure to understand that ISIL is the symptom, not the root cause, of the turbulences in
the region.
While the US openly cooperates with the Iraqi government, it still dismisses the Syrian
regime as illegitimate. Nevertheless, the previous inflexibility of Washington on the idea of
engaging with Bashar al Assad clearly evolved during the months following the launching
of Operation Inherent Resolve. At the operational level, the US Air Force launched strikes
in places where Syrian aircraft would also fly only a few hours later. By the end of 2014, the
rumour in Damascus was that Iraqi officials were channeling American communications
to Assad’s circle.15 The Syrian president also conveyed this information during his February
interview with the BBC.16
Progressively, the US administration became less categorical in its condemnation of
Assad and his allies (Iran and Hezbollah). On December 3, when asked about Iranian
strikes against ISIL, Secretary Kerry said that the “net effect is positive”.17 He specified,
though, that the US and Iran were “not only not coordinating militarily right now, but
there are no plans at this time to coordinate militarily”. Still, Kerry’s statement epitomized
the evolving order of priorities with regard to Syria. Since the end of 2014, the Obama
national security team has been clearly reconsidering the idea that Assad may stay in power
and it has been reviewing its potential courses of action accordingly.
This new thinking comes from the realization that, after four years of conflict, moderate
Syrian rebels are not managing to prevail. Revealingly, Brett McGurk, the Deputy
14 See Pape R (1996). Bombing to win: air power and coercion in war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, and
one of its critics, Watts B (1997). Ignoring reality: problems of theory and evidence in security studies.
Security Studies. No. 2, Vol. 7, Winter, pp. 115-71.
15 Phone interview with source in Damascus, December 2014.
16 Bowen J (2015). Assad says Syria is informed on anti-IS air campaign. BBC.com , 10 February 2015.
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17 Michaeli I (2014). Kerry calls Iran airstrikes on Islamic State “positive”, Al Monitor, 7 December 2014.