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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

22

these movements take a less hard-line approach

that is not dominated by short-term objectives.

The most important aspect of this in Euro-

pean terms is that the EU has been forced to

clarify that unilateral independence within the

EU is impossible, among other reasons because

Article 4 of the Treaty of Lisbon (included by the

Convention on the European Constitution and

retained unaltered in the Treaty) obliges Brussels

to respect the constitutional and territorial or-

ganization of member states.

As a result, Catalan nationalists have come

up against the barrier of European rejection,

which has probably been the strongest argu-

ment against their separatist project and estab-

lishes a “political jurisprudence” that will serve

as a warning to any who consider setting out on

a similar path in the future.

Returning to the United Kingdom, it seems

certain that Scottish nationalism will renew its

calls for a second independence referendum in

the event of the UK as a whole voting in favour

of Brexit (and Scotland voting to remain). In this

situation, it would be almost impossible for Lon-

don to refuse demands for another referendum,

and the likelihood is that Scotland would vote

for independence in protest at being dragged

out of the EU against its will.

The campaign for Brexit also presents an ex-

ample of another kind of nationalism, this time

blended with Euroscepticism, in the form of the

populist arguments put forward by the Leave

campaign, which includes UKIP and a large

chunk of the Conservative Party. The EU refer-

endum of 23 June 2016, following on from the

Brussels deal, will be a key test of whether those

in favour of continued membership of the EU

are able to prevail over anti-European discourse.

There is also a third kind of nationalism that

has surfaced in the EU during 2015, one that is

associated with anti-Brussels populism. From

Tsipras in Greece, to Orbán in Hungary, and in-

cluding Kaczynski in Poland and Marine Le Pen

in France, extremist parties have repeatedly

sought to contrast national sovereignty with EU

decisions, presenting the Union as an external

actor that interferes with the decisions of indi-

vidual countries in an unacceptable manner,

whether to impose economic policies or to dis-

tort their political structures.

In every case, the EU has remained firm in

the exercise of its competencies, and it can be

argued that it has emerged as the winner from

this debate. The case of Greece is the clearest,

with the 13 July agreement between Athens

and Brussels and the subsequent implementa-

tion of this agreement by the Syriza govern-

ment.

Nationalist discourse does not appear to

have led to an increase in Euroscepticism during

2015. According to the European Parliament’s

2015

Parlameter

, the number of interviewees

who believe that their country has benefited

from membership of the EU is higher than ever

before; a majority believe that what unites

member states is more important than what di-

vides them; and, finally, the EU is perceived as

being best placed to respond to the conse-

quences of the economic and financial crisis.

However, it is important not to forget that

far-right populist parties, which have made sig-

nificant electoral progress and are now in gov-

ernment in a number of member states, count

an anti-European stance as a core element of

their programme. The mainstream parties

should respond by placing pro-European dis-

course at the centre of their programmes, in-

stead of watering it down or concealing it,

something that happens all too frequently.

At the same time, it is important to be aware

that Euroscepticism is directly related to the

harsh daily realities of the economic crisis. As